Watchdog finds dramatic cuts to independent weapons testing office reduced oversight

The Pentagon's overhaul of its independent weapons testing office has reduced the organization's oversight capacity, left remaining staff responsible for more programs outside their areas of expertise and sharply narrowed the portfolio of acquisition programs receiving operational evaluations, according to a new Government Accountability Office assessment. The June 30 report , which Congress mandated following a major restructuring of the Office of the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E) announced last year by Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth and the “Department of Government Efficiency” (DOGE), contains a key slide with a blunt assessment: “Reorganization Has Reduced DOT&E’s Oversight Capacity.” The report draws findings from interviews with DOT&E personnel and internal program data, concluding cuts to the organization altered not only the size of the workforce, but how the office performs its statutory oversight mission. The Hegseth-directed DOGE review, which he said found “redundant,” “non-essential” and “non-statutory” functions at DOT&E, slashed the office’s staff from 126 (106 positions filled) to only 30 in May 2025, according to the assessment. The staff was later expanded to 45 in September, though staffing reviews are ongoing. The staffing cuts have reshaped oversight work inside DOT&E. According to the report, action officers told GAO they are now assigned more programs than before, frequently manage systems outside their core subject matter expertise, and in some cases lack sufficient depth in areas such as electronic warfare following workforce reductions. Several described themselves as “overwhelmed and overworked.” “Action Officers also said that the losses in oversight depth and breadth caused by the workforce reductions, and subsequent loss of subject matter expertise, increase the risk of weapon systems being delivered to warfighters with undocumented shortfalls related to effectiveness, suitability, survivability, or lethality,” a slide states. The restructuring also eliminated or replaced Senior Executive Service (SES)-level officials, including deputy directors, which were substituted in practice by GS-15 action officers carrying dual-hatted responsibilities. Additionally, DOT&E action officers noted “both temporary and permanent” losses of staff who oversaw “highly classified programs with limited access.” "They said that some Action Officers responsible for these programs eventually returned, but the capability gaps remain,” the report states. Fewer programs under review, shifting oversight model One of the most significant findings in the assessment is the contraction in the number of programs under DOT&E review following a May 2025 memorandum that triggered the reorganization. More than 90 programs were removed from DOT&E’s oversight portfolio, according to the report. GAO noted these removals occurred for a mix of reasons, including completed testing, program cancellation, mergers and DOT&E determinations that oversight was no longer necessary. At the same time, the office’s overall oversight list declined from roughly 265 programs to 173. GAO emphasized that while the removals cannot be attributed solely to staffing reductions or the reorganization, the scale and timing of the changes raised questions about the office’s capacity to sustain prior levels of independent review. MTA oversight gap draws attention The report highlights a particularly sharp contraction in oversight of Middle Tier of Acquisition (MTA) programs, a rapid acquisition pathway that has drawn increasing congressional scrutiny. Though there is no explicit statutory requirement for DOT&E to test MTA programs, the office received $10.6 million from Congress in fiscal year 2024 specifically to expand oversight of such programs. However, GAO found by February 2026, only about 15 of roughly 110 MTA programs were included on DOT&E’s oversight list. That disparity stood out in the assessment, particularly as action officers told GAO they were concerned services could use MTAs and other rapid prototyping pathways -- intentionally or otherwise -- to reduce exposure to traditional operational test and evaluation requirements. While the report does not conclude that such avoidance is occurring, it identifies the risk as an area of concern given the reduced oversight footprint. Temporary loss of testing data access GAO also found DOT&E action officers were unable to access key testing data for approximately two months after contractor support from the Institute for Defense Analyses was paused following a defense secretary memorandum and work by DOGE. The information is contained on a slide titled: “Infrastructure Constraints Resulting from Reorganization Hamper DOT&E Oversight.” The lapse temporarily limited access to historical and ongoing test data used in oversight reviews, according to the report. While the interruption was not characterized as long-term, GAO included it as evidence of how organizational and contracting changes can directly affect the execution of oversight functions. Consolidation of DOT&E office space also resulted in reductions to “secure workspaces,” specifically the loss of half the organization’s secure compartmented information facilities (SCIFs). Questions for Congress GAO framed several findings as a policy question for Congress, recommending lawmakers assess “whether the existing authority of the DOT&E to determine staffing needs and the type of leadership positions within the organization is sufficient to support congressional expectations for the scope of oversight expected from DOT&E.” The report also repeatedly returns to whether lawmakers intend for DOT&E to maintain oversight responsibility over emerging acquisition pathways such as MTAs and classified programs at historical levels, suggesting Congress may need to clarify expectations for independent operational testing in an acquisition environment increasingly dominated by rapid prototyping and alternative acquisition authorities. GAO also urges Congress to consider whether steps are needed to help the Defense Department establish its own centralized digital test and evaluation data repository, instead of relying on a contractor-run system managed by IDA, and to provide DOT&E with additional secure facilities to support oversight of classified programs.